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Highly technical rules for regional electricity markets shape opportunities for new
technologies and the pace of transition to a cleaner and more distributed power system.
We compare three case studies of regional transmission organizations and identify
common mechanisms that describe the relationship between institutional design and
administrative policy decisions. We compare industry actors, old and new, across these
case studies to better understand structural power and institutional stability through four
mechanisms drawn from the literature: (1) self-reinforcing interests, (2) participation in and
position of groups, (3) influence over communication and information, and (4) control over
problem framing and pace of decisions. A focus on the mechanisms that operate within
RTO governance provides insight into needed RTO governance reform.
Keywords: regional transmission organizations, electricity markets, energy storage, energy transitions, policy
implementation, participatory democracy, institutional design

INTRODUCTION
Ongoing efforts to promote more sustainable, resilient, and equitable energy systems are disrupting
economic, political, and institutional relationships (Lockwood et al., 2017; Loorbach et al., 2017).
Correspondingly, issues of power and politics are now central themes in sustainability transition
research (Breetz et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2018; Brisbois, 2019). This body of literature recognizes
that sustainability transitions are highly contested, involving political-economy challenges of
power, resistance, and redistribution. Moreover, energy transitions research has begun to examine
these concepts in particular institutional settings (Stokes and Breetz, 2018; Brisbois et al.,
2019; Lockwood et al., 2019). Recent attention has focused on the political dynamics within
administrative agencies, as well as the potentially transformative capacity associated with the
implementation of existing laws (Garmestani et al., 2019; MacLean, 2020).
Wholesale electricity trading has long been viewed as a depoliticized technical
task, but regional electricity transmission and market debates are often contentious.
Recent conflicts over capacity market design, interstate transmission, state clean
energy policy implementation, and responses to climate extremes highlight the
political, financial, and social stakes involved with these administrative decisions
(Chen, 2019; Peskoe, 2020; St. John, 2020a; Spiegel, 2021; Watson M., 2021).
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studies offer a significant contribution by illuminating how RTO
decisions occur in practice and the procedural opportunities
and challenges for new market entrants to meaningfully
participate in RTO decision-making practices. Our analysis
also contributes to the understanding of power dynamics in
sustainability transitions and the opportunities and limits of
transformative capacity within institutional arrangements for
administrative policymaking. By comparing change across these
case studies, we provide further evidence supporting research
arguing that the exercise of power depends on variations in
interests, institutional design, and ideas (Kern, 2011; Scott,
2014; Lockwood et al., 2019). Additionally, we identify patterns
in the decision-making dynamics across our cases, suggesting
common institutional design challenges associated with complex
institutional arrangements for regulation.
In our case studies of storage market rule development,
we find evidence of structural power and institutional stability
associated with mechanisms drawn from the literature. These
cases expand the understanding of how these mechanisms
operate in different contexts by highlighting the influence of
regulatory arrangements at multiple levels and across different
functions. The cases also illuminate how governance design
affects political dynamics among stakeholders and how structures
and processes often limit the influence of new business models
or new technologies in administrative policy decisions. We
conclude RTO stakeholder engagement practices could be
strengthened, and we provide several specific recommendations
for stakeholders and regulators to consider.
The next section provides background on wholesale
multilateral electricity markets and energy storage. The
Theoretical Framework: Structural Power and Stability in
Energy System. The Governance section outlines our theoretical
framework and The Methods section describes our research
methods. The last three sections present our findings, discussion,
and conclusions.

Over the past three decades, the electric power sector
in the United States has been restructured to introduce
more competition. At the same time, public policy and
technological innovation have promoted a cleaner and more
decentralized electricity grid. These changes have introduced
participatory approaches to electricity system governance and
new institutional arrangements for regulation (Dworkin et al.,
2013; Baldwin, 2018; Lenhart and Fox, 2021). A large literature
examines the economic and legal aspects of restructuring the
electricity sector (Hogan, 2002; Cramton, 2003; Blumsack, 2007;
Walawalkar et al., 2008; Borenstein and Bushnell, 2015; Eisen,
2016; Rossi, 2016; Peskoe, 2021; Welton S., 2021). However, the
political dynamics and exercise of structural power within these
new institutional arrangements have received less attention, as
has the interplay of market rules and state clean energy policy
(Lenhart et al., 2016; Stafford and Wilson, 2016; Konschnik, 2019;
Baldwin and Tang, 2021).
In regions of the United States with competitive multi-lateral
wholesale markets, electricity system governance occurs through
interactions among industry actors, state and federal regulators,
policymakers, and civil society representatives working to
develop administrative policy that is ultimately formalized
through tariffs, rules, and practices. Highly technical rules formed
through stakeholder processes within regional transmission
organizations and independent system operators (hereafter
RTOs) have substantial impacts on consumer electricity prices,
air quality, carbon emissions, the value of energy investments,
and the pace of transition to a cleaner and more distributed
system (Paine et al., 2014; Yoo and Blumsack, 2018). Yet,
the opportunities for meaningful participation, the influence of
differently positioned stakeholders, and variations in institutional
arrangements across RTOs are not well understood.
This paper examines case studies of the mechanisms that
link RTO decision-making processes and the market rules for
one set of new grid technologies: energy storage resources. We
focus on the evolution of storage market rules in three RTO
regions: the California Independent System Operator (CAISO),
the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), and the Independent System
Operator New England (ISO-NE). These cases reflect diversity
in the origins of the RTO, the extent of market restructuring,
major market design elements, state clean energy policies, and
energy generation mix. For each of these RTOs, we trace how the
interests of stakeholders, the institutional design of stakeholder
processes, and state actions influenced the design of storage
market rules.
Our analysis makes both empirical and theoretical
contributions to the literature on energy system governance. The
institutional design and dynamics of RTO decision-making are
not well documented in the literature, let alone the details of
how market rules are affecting energy storage. Our original case

BACKGROUND: ENERGY MARKETS AND
ENERGY STORAGE
The electric power sector has a long history of voluntary
coordination among utilities to achieve operational and planning
efficiencies (Peskoe, 2021). Investor-owned utilities (IOUs)
built interconnected transmission networks and coordinated
operations through what are often referred to as regional power
pools. These voluntary industry agreements were used to share
reserve capacity, exchange excess low-cost electricity, and in
some cases, to implement joint dispatch of generation resources.
By the late 1990s, the United States had 17 large multi-plant
utilities with central dispatch, five power pools, and several other
“loose” power pools with less formal coordination1 (Cramer
and Tschirhart, 1983; U.S. Energy Information Administration,
1998).

Abbreviations: CAISO, California Independent System Operator; FERC, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission; FPA, Federal Power Act; IOU, investor-owned
utility; ISO-NE, Independent System Operator of New England; NOPR, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking; SPP, Southwest Power Pool; RPS, renewable portfolio
standard; RSC, Regional States Committee; RTO, independent system operator
and regional transmission operator.
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1 Power pools coordinate a range of activities. A distinction is often made
between “tight” power pools that coordinate operations through central dispatch
and “loose” power pools that coordinate some services, but do not have
central dispatch.
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This coordination benefited consumers through efficiencies
and improved reliability but also created barriers for the
growing independent generation market (Peskoe, 2021). To
promote competition in power generation and retail service,
the electricity sector was restructured (Borenstein and Bushnell,
2015). The power pools and large utilities with central
dispatch became central actors in the formation of independent
organizations to operate the system (Hogan et al., 1996;
Joskow, 1996). Today, seven RTOs are regulated by FERC
as they manage approximately 70% of U.S. electricity sales
through transmission planning, operations, and administration
of multilateral wholesale electricity markets (U.S. Energy
Information Administration, 2013). Of these seven RTOs, six
emerged from existing agreements among IOUs to coordinate
operations through central dispatch (Boulden, 2016).
RTO governance is shaped by these historical institutional
relationships and concepts established in three FERC
rulemakings. Order 888 provides a foundation for the voluntary
formation of RTOs and requires fair and non-discriminatory
rules of governance (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
1997). Order 2000 requires each RTO to maintain a decisionmaking process that is independent of control by any class of
market participants. Order 719 requires RTOs to ensure ongoing
responsiveness to customers and other stakeholders (Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000, 2008). The resulting
RTO governance designs vary across regions with differences
in participation, communication and information sharing, and
collective decision-making practices.
These RTO governance structures that developed to support
restructuring and a growing independent power producer
market segment are now confronting the complexity of
integrating innovative technical capabilities, novel business
models, and increasingly diverse stakeholders. RTO stakeholder
engagement processes, market participation models, and market
rules were originally designed to accommodate centralized
generation, long-distance transmission, and transmissiondependent distribution utilities. Stakeholders are typically
grouped into sectors according to the services provided, for
example, transmission, generation, or distribution, or according
to traditional business models, such as investor-owned utilities
or electric cooperatives. Within this structure, some services such
as generation, are fully traded in markets, whereas, other services
such as transmission, are based on cost-of-service rates and
other services such as primary frequency response are, for the
most part, uncompensated (Sioshansi et al., 2012). As a resource
that provides multiple services at different points in time, energy
storage presents unique challenges to these institutional designs.
In the United States, energy storage is a $1.5 billion annual
market and is projected to grow from 1.2 GW to 7 GW between
2020 and 2025 (Wood Mackenzie Power and Renewables/Energy
Storage Association, 2020). Eight states have targets for energy
storage deployment and ten states have grants, rebates, tax
incentives, or other programs to encourage storage deployment
(North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, 2021). Much
of this deployment is anticipated to earn a substantial share
of its revenue through markets designed and operated by
RTOs. Storage can be used to shift power production from
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periods with low prices to periods with higher prices (i.e.,
energy arbitrage), supply power at times of peak load, provide
fast ramping to complement rapid increases and decreases in
variable renewable generation, improve transmission efficiency,
avoid or defer transmission investments through targeted local
power supply that relieves congestion, and provide ancillary
services that support grid stability (Victor et al., 2019; Denholm
et al., 2020). In practice, most legacy pumped-storage plants
are deployed and operated based on a single value stream.
However, new technologies, such as batteries or flywheels, can
rapidly alternate between generation and charging but have
lower overall capacity and shorter discharge times. Storage
optimization studies find that “stacking benefits” across multiple
value streams, including energy, capacity, and ancillary services
can significantly increase revenue relative to a single value stream
(Chang et al., 2014; Hledik et al., 2017). Because storage can
provide many different grid services, can interconnect to the
transmission or distribution system, and can be deployed at a
wide range of scales with different power capacities and discharge
durations, it crosses asset classes and has different operational
capabilities and limitations than other resources (Akhil et al.,
2013; Albertus et al., 2020).
In recent years, FERC has taken steps to open opportunities
for storage to participate in restructured markets (see Orders
890, 719, 755, 764, 792, 825, 845, and 2222), with the most
explicit action being Order 841: Electric Storage Participation in
Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and
Independent System Operators. This rulemaking was initiated
by FERC, under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),
based on its finding that then-existing RTO market rules were
“unjust and unreasonable in light of barriers that they present
to the participation of electric storage resources in the RTO/ISO
markets” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2018, p. 1).
Specifically, FERC found that market participation rules designed
for traditional resources limit the range of services that emerging
technologies can provide. For example, in several of the RTO
markets, storage was limited to a single market service such
as frequency regulation. This final rule has been described
as a “landmark” order and an “enormous step” for energy
storage with the potential to create major new opportunities
by opening access to energy, capacity, and ancillary services
markets (Energy Storage Association, 2019; St. John, 2020b).
RTOs implementing this administrative policy are required to
negotiate diverse interests and develop novel market designs
with important implications for the sustainability, affordability,
and resilience of regional electricity grids. These implementation
processes provide rich case studies for examining the relationship
between RTO governance design, stakeholder participation, and
market rule outcomes.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
STRUCTURAL POWER AND STABILITY IN
ENERGY SYSTEM GOVERNANCE
The decision-making processes and dynamics of regional
wholesale market design have received less research attention
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than the economic and legal aspects of electricity sector
restructuring. The need for a better understanding of RTO
governance is highlighted by studies identifying concerns
regarding RTO institutional structures and public interest
accountability (Dworkin and Goldwasser, 2007; Kavulla, 2019;
Simeone, 2021), the balance of decision-making power between
state and federal regulators (Dennis et al., 2016; Chen and
Murnan, 2019), and the ability to further state clean energy
policy goals (Cullenward and Welton, 2018; Welton S., 2021).
Responding to this need, we examine RTO governance through
the lens of institutional design and power to shed light on the
politics of sustainability transitions.
A growing body of research recognizes sustainable
energy transitions as highly contested involving political
power and policy influence (Avelino, 2017; Köhrsen, 2018;
Stokes and Breetz, 2018; Brisbois et al., 2019; Hess, 2019).
Drawing on institutional theory, transitions research seeks
to understand and accelerate system change by examining
the structures that influence collective action, such as rules,
norms, values, or practices and the degree to which these
structures are institutionalized (Geels and Shot, 2010; Geels,
2011; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). A strategic action
field perspective extends this work by focusing attention on
the differences in the power among collective actors and the
contribution of ongoing contentions and strategic actions to
processes of change and stability (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011,
2012; Kungl and Hess, 2021).
Within this theoretical framework for institutions and power,
researchers seeking to understand how politics and policy
influence can acceleration energy transitions have begun to focus
on the mechanisms that explain how effects are produced in
contested institutional processes (Roberts et al., 2018). These
underlying mechanisms are often conceptualized as an interplay
of interests, collective identity, and shared ideas (Kern, 2011;
Scott, 2014; Lockwood et al., 2019). Interests and incentives
create path dependence through positive feedback. Collective
identity forms through social entanglements and commitments
created and reinforced by institutional structures such as rules,
procedures, and norms. Shared ideas create taken-for-granted
assumptions that shape debates and behaviors (Scott, 2014).
These mechanisms can create positive feedback effects and
institutional stability, particularly when processes are complex
and opaque making it difficult to determine whether or not
the institutional processes are performing as intended (Pierson,
1993; Lockwood et al., 2015). Integrating research on energy
transitions and politics, Brisbois (2019) aligns these general
mechanisms with conceptualizations of power and identifies a
finer-grain set of mechanisms through which power dynamics
can operate in energy policy processes. This research highlights
that structural power associated with institutional design and
collective commitments can manifest through the dynamics of
how actor groups are positioned, influence on the relevant
knowledge and information used in processes, and influence on
problem framing and agenda setting (Brisbois, 2019).
Applying these concepts, our study aims to understand
the dynamics of interorganizational governance in the
implementation of a particular highly technical program
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intervention to integrate storage technologies into RTO
markets. RTOs can be considered hybrid organizations that
mix institutional logics and practices to allow translation of
ideas across boundaries in a diverse field of interdependent
organizations (Scott, 2014; Nelson-Marsh, 2017). RTOs operate
in organizational fields encompassing legacy electricity sector
actors, new market entrants, and increasingly diverse consumer
interests while also being situated at an intersection of state
and federal regulation and policy. While in some cases RTOs
are participating in implementing state clean energy policies
(Stafford and Wilson, 2016), in others, the interface with state
policy is less clear and a source of contestation (Cullenward and
Welton, 2018).
Given our interest in understanding the political implication
of observed variations in RTO governance, we seek to identify the
mechanisms that describe the relationship between institutional
design and outcome in terms of market rules for storage. To
support this empirical work, we examine the political and
economic characteristics that establish institutional relationships
within the field and the institutional logic for each RTO in
our study including organizational form/ownership, extent of
regulatory restructuring, existing generation mix, and identity.
Additionally, we examine how actors are positioned (or
excluded) within and across groups, the venues for incorporating
relevant new knowledge and information, and the actors and
processes that control problem framing, agenda setting, and pace
of decision making. The overall aim is to assess whether there is
evidence that institutional design allows legacy electricity sector
actors to exercise structural power and whether positive feedback
is acting as a source of institutional stability and preventing
change needed to accelerate sustainability transitions.

METHODS
Because we are interested in how institutional design influences
stakeholder participation and market outcomes, this paper
examines cases of RTOs with diverse institutional designs
implementing similar market reforms over the same time
period. Specifically, we trace decision-making for storage
market participation rules through the stakeholder engagement
processes of three RTOs with different political and economic
characteristics and different governance structures.

Case Selection
Our research relies on case studies to understand the dynamics of
administrative policy change in RTOs as they unfold in practice
(Stake, 2005). We use our theoretical framework to focus on
the causal mechanisms within particular cases and use process
tracing to investigate specific propositions about evidence that
contribute to our understanding of the relationships between
structures, actors, and outcomes (Beach and Brun, 2019). In this
study, we are specifically focused on theory-testing. Drawing on
the theoretical discussion in Theoretical Framework: Structural
Power and Stability in Energy System Governance section,
we conceptualize the mechanisms that contribute to structural
power and institutional stability and develop propositions about
evidence for our research. Specifically, we are interested in
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RTO market stakeholders and state actors and the activities of
constructing economic and political interests, forming sectors
and coalitions, sharing of relevant knowledge and information,
and controlling problem framings and pace of decisions.
To trace these dynamics, we develop longitudinal case studies
over approximately a decade for three RTOs: CAISO, SPP, and
ISO-NE. The cases briefly present the history of market rule
development related to storage technologies before, during, and
after issuance of FERC Order 841 with a focus on specific
institutional design elements. The RTOs in our study differ
across regulatory and market dimensions (Table 1; Figure 1),
generation resources and policy contexts (Table 2; Figure 2), and
governance structures (explained within our case study findings).
Of the three study sites, CAISO operates within the most
coherent regulatory and policy context. CAISO serves a single
state and is established in state statute (California AB 1890).
The California market is partially restructured allowing market
competition for industrial and commercial customers and

community choice aggregation (Figure 1). Planning for resource
adequacy is done through bilateral contracts, rather than a
centralized capacity market. California has been a leader in
setting aggressive clean energy policy goals with a current target
of 100% clean energy by 2045 and a storage capacity target
of 1,325 MW by 2020. Variable renewables comprise ∼26% of
average annual energy production and curtailment rates for wind
and solar are 0.5 and 1.5%, respectively (Table 2). Overall, the
dominant energy resources in CAISO are renewables balanced
with natural gas (Figure 2).

TABLE 1 | Comparison of context dimensions across selected regional
transmission organizations.

TABLE 2 | State energy policies, variable renewable generation, and curtailment
across selected regional transmission organizations.
California
ISO

Southwest
Power Pool

ISO-New
England

State clean or
renewable energy
policies*

CA 100%
clean by
2045

1 of 14 states
NM 100%
clean by 2045

6 of 6 states
ME 100% RPS
by 2050

State storage
goals or incentives

1,325 MW
by 2020

None

CT 1,000 MW by
2030

California
ISO

Southwest
Power Pool

ISO-New
England

MA 1,000 MWh
by 2025 and
financial incentive

States served*

1

14

6

NH financial
incentive

Origin

State
legislation

Loose power
pool

Tight power
pool

Restructuring
status

Partial retail
competition

No retail
competition

Retail
competition

Capacity market

No market

No market

Mandatory

Net Imports

21%

Net exporter

21%

Average annual
variable generation
(2020)

26%

30%

6%

Average annual
curtailment (2018)

0.5% wind

1.3% wind

2.7% wind

1.5% solar

RPS, renewable portfolio standard; clean, clean energy standard.
*Count of state policies only includes those with targets in 2020 or later years.
Sources: National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2020), California Independent System
Operator (2021a), Independent System Operator of New England (2021a), North Carolina
Clean Energy Technology Center (2021), and Southwest Power Pool (2021a).

*All or part.
Sources: 21st Century Power Partnership (2017), California Independent System
Operator (2020, 2021a), Independent System Operator of New England (2021a,b), and
Southwest Power Pool (2021a,b).

FIGURE 1 | Share of annual megawatthours of sales by ownership type for selected regional transmission organizations. Source: U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2020a).
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FIGURE 2 | Share of energy generation by resource for selected regional transmission organizations. Sources: California Independent System Operator (2021a),
Independent System Operator of New England (2021b), Southwest Power Pool (2021a).

ISO has a 2.7% curtailment rate for wind resources (Table 2).
Overall, the generation mix is heavily reliant on natural gas
(Figure 2).

SPP operates in a multi-state context with limited electricity
market restructuring and few clean energy policy goals. It serves
all or part of 14 states and a relatively large share of public
and electric cooperative utilities that fall outside the purview of
state rate regulation. The states served by SPP do not offer retail
power choice and they have retained authority over resource
adequacy planning. SPP retail sales are managed by vertically
integrated and consumer-owned public or cooperative utilities
and SPP does not operate a capacity market (Figure 1). The
SPP market is new relative to other RTOs. It began operating
as an energy imbalance market in 2007 and added day-ahead
energy and operating reserve markets in 2014. Following this
expansion of services, the SPP footprint almost doubled with
the addition of three public power utilities (Sawyer, 2016).
Of the 14 states served by SPP, New Mexico is the only one
with an active clean or renewable electricity policy. None of
the states within the SPP footprint have implemented storage
policy goals (Table 2). Although coal represents the largest energy
generation source within the SPP market, wind accounts for
nearly 30% of generation and now exceeds its use of natural gas
(Figure 2).
Of the three study sites, ISO-NE operates with the greatest
degree of market restructuring. It has almost fully transitioned to
independent power producers for generation and five of the six
states allow competitive retail power marketing, with Vermont
being the exception (Figure 1). ISO-NE was created by the New
England Power Pool (NEPOOL), and it is one of three RTOs with
a mandatory capacity market (Independent System Operator
of New England, 2019). This highly restructured regulatory
context operates alongside a range of state energy policy goals.
All six states served by ISO-NE have active renewable portfolio
standards (RPS). Moreover, Massachusetts has a target of 1,000
MWh of installed energy storage by 2025 and Connecticut has
a target of 1,000 MW of energy storage by 2030. Despite these
policy goals, variable renewable resources only comprise 6% of
the average annual energy generation managed ISO-NE and the
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Data Collection and Analysis
The timelines and mechanisms for each case study were
developed from primary sources and documents including
market rule proposals, stakeholder comments, and white papers
in RTO archives; filings in FERC proceedings; and semistructured interviews with RTO staff and stakeholders. To
evaluate institutional design differences and the impact on
storage market rules, we reconstruct actions, recommendations,
and decisions, with a focus on identifying the sequence of events
occurring contemporaneously in parallel RTO actions. We then
examine evidence of why and how an RTO as a collective actor
made decisions about storage market rules and we identified the
temporal and procedural aspects of the policy design process.
From March 2020 through May 2021, we conducted
41 interviews with practitioners engaged with CAISO
(14 interviewees), SPP (14 interviewees), and ISO-NE
(13 interviewees) (see Supplementary Appendix 1). The
recruitment strategy targeted experts involved in RTO processes;
purposeful sampling was conducted to ensure distribution
across stakeholder sectors. Interviews were conducted via video
and/or audio calls and typically lasted between 30 mins to
1 h. The interviews were guided by 10 primary questions that
allowed us to ask practitioners about access to decision-making
processes, representation, whether engagement opportunities
are meaningful, the ability for different participants to influence
decision-making, and recommendations for process changes
(see Supplementary Appendix 1).
Data analysis for the interviews used an iterative coding
process (Saldana, 2009). We began coding guided by our
research interest in institutional logic, breadth of participation,
information sharing, approach to communication and collective
decisions, procedural design and fairness, and organizational
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In 2010, FERC opened a notice of inquiry seeking comments
on storage uses and issues. This was followed by a 2016 data
request regarding storage treatment within existing market rules
and later in the same year a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NOPR) on electric storage market participation. FERC found
that while storage resources are already providing energy
and ancillary services in some markets, they do so through
participation models designed for other technologies or models
that limit the full range of services that storage can provide.
Based on these barriers, FERC found that the existing rules
discriminated against energy storage resources and it took action
under Section 206 of the FPA requiring RTOs to enable storage
resources located on the interstate transmission system, on a
distribution system, or behind-the-meter to participate to the full
extent of each storage technology’s capabilities (Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 2018). Unlike market rule proposals
initiated through RTO processes under Section 205 authority,
the action taken by FERC under Section 206 includes specific
minimum requirements that each RTO is required to meet, to
achieve “just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory”
market rules.
Concurrent with and following these FERC actions, RTOs
were responding to staff and stakeholder concerns and
developing proposals through their governance structures.
Table 3 highlights FERC actions, state energy storage policy
initiatives, RTO engagement in efforts with outside actors, and
RTO communication and decision-making actions, with a focus
on identifying the sequence of events. The following sections
build on this timeline to present our case studies of why and how
each RTO made particular decisions about storage market rules.

adaptive capacity. Subsequent cycles of coding reorganized the
codes to create seven categories that support our themes (see
Supplementary Appendix 1).

FINDINGS
In the United States, the expansion of grid-connected storage has
been uneven across the country. Pumped-storage hydroelectric
power is the most common form of energy storage. Currently,
42 pumped storage projects provide 22,800 MW of capacity,
representing ∼90% of the existing U.S. storage capacity (National
Technology & Engineering Sciences of Sandia, LLC, 2020;
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020a,b). Most of
these plants were developed in the 1970s and 1980s and
are concentrated in five states. In our case study sites, three
pumped storage projects provide 1,719 MW of capacity in
the CAISO region with several other projects announced or
commissioned and two pumped storage projects providing
2,312 MW of capacity in ISO-NE with one additional small
project commissioned. The SPP region has one 260 MW
non-dispatchable pumped-storage project. The more recent
expansion of batteries, electro-mechanical storage (e.g., flywheels
and compressed air), and thermal storage is also unevenly
distributed. In our case study sites, the capacity from storage
resources, excluding pumped storage, ranges from 5 MW in SPP
to more than 900 MW in CAISO (Figure 3).
The integration of storage into RTO markets has also
evolved in different ways. Typically, a defined participation
model, associated technical requirements, and other market
rules determine how a resource can engage in an RTO market.
However, each RTO develops these rules through its own
institutional processes and is building off a different foundation
of market and governance design as it responds to market
demands, stakeholder interests, and regulatory requirements.

California Independent System Operator
CAISO describes itself as “helping lead the electricity
industry’s transformation to a cleaner and more reliable

FIGURE 3 | Rated power of energy storage projects by regional transmission organizations in 2020 (MW)*. *Excludes pumped-storage hydroelectric projects.
Sources: National Technology & Engineering Sciences of Sandia, LLC, 2020.
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TABLE 3 | Timeline of FERC and RTO actions on electric storage resource market rules.
Year

California ISO

Southwest Power Pool

2008

ISO-New England
Alternative technology regulation resource
product

2010

FERC notice of inquiry (AD10-13-000):
Electric storage technologies
California storage procurement mandate (AB 2514)

2011

Non-generator resource model

2014

DER participation model

Dependence on natural gas identified as
greatest challenge

Joint energy storage roadmap process

Integrated market launched without
storage participation

2016

ISO-NE white paper on storage
FERC data requests (AD16-20-000):
Rules that affect participation of electric storage resources
Integrating wholesale markets and state public
policy (IMAPP)

Phase 1 state-of-charge enhancements

FERC notice of proposed rulemaking (RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000):
Electric storage participation in markets operated by RTOs/ISOs
Improvements to dispatchable asset-related
demand product
2018

FERC final rule (RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000):
Order 841 electric storage participation in markets operated by RTOs and ISOs
Holistic integrated tariff team established by
board

Massachusetts storage procurement target
(HB 4857)

Phase 2 demand response

Storage in generator interconnection
studies

Enhanced storage participation (projects
> 1 MW)

Order 841 compliance filing

Order 841 compliance filing

Order 841 compliance filing

2019

Phase 3A dispatchable demand response

Holistic integrated tariff team report

Protests and comments

2020

Phase 3B allow storage to bid increases and decreases
in load

Storage white paper

Future Grid Initiative

Phase 4 refinement to DER and storage participation
models

Phase 2 energy storage resources

Hybrid resource initiative to optimize as a single resource
(ongoing)

Electric storage resources steering
committee and electric
Storage resource task force

2021

Storage resources and pathways to a future
grid

Gray, FERC action; Blue, state policy action; Tan, formal process for interaction with non-members.

grid” (California Independent System Operator, 2020). In
our data collection, CAISO governance was characterized as
responsive to state policy direction, interactive with stakeholders,
resource-intensive, driven by management and staff, and “on
the cutting edge” of introducing new technologies into the grid.
CAISO has been at the forefront of addressing certain RTO
design issues, like transmission planning for renewable resources
and storage market participation, with FERC subsequently
integrating CAISO approaches into industry-wide rulemakings.
CAISO serves a single state where electricity service is
dominated by three large IOUs that own transmission, provide
retail services, and own some generation. The RTO Board is
appointed by the Governor of California and the RTO has
interdependent working relationships with California energy
agencies, including the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC). For

Frontiers in Climate | www.frontiersin.org

example, the state’s resource adequacy processes involve all
three agencies.
Efforts to integrate storage resources into the CAISO market
have evolved along with a series of California clean energy
statutes. California energy policies include RPS targets that
have escalated between 2002 and 2018, a mandate to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and a target for 100% carbon-free
energy by 2045 (SB1078, SB350, AB32, SB100). California’s
storage mandate for 1,325 MW of new storage by 2024 was
allocated across the three major IOUs in the CAISO market.
At the time, CAISO lacked market rules to efficiently value
storage products.
Between 2011 and 2014, CAISO established a non-generator
resource participation model, reviewed storage interconnection
requirements, and developed rules to allow small storage resource
aggregation. In 2014, CAISO and two state energy agencies
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When FERC issued the NOPR for electric storage participation,
CAISO had already developed storage and distributed energy
resources participation models (California Independent System
Operator, 2017). CAISO’s Order 841 compliance filing reduced
the minimum size requirement for storage participation, but
otherwise included few changes. Despite these efforts, the full
integration of storage into the CASIO market, planning, and
operations requires more work:

(i.e., the CPUC, and the CEC) developed a joint Energy
Storage Roadmap to facilitate storage deployment in support of
California’s energy and environmental policy goals. The roadmap
process included outreach to solicit input from any interested
stakeholder through an online survey, emails, and interviews of
selected stakeholders. The roadmap generated a high level of
interest with 400–500 stakeholders participating in the initial
workshop, 131 survey respondents, and 36 different entities
submitting background information and written comments.
These ideas were used in an iterative process of developing
summary reports and draft documents, facilitating workshop
discussions, and soliciting written stakeholder comments. The
roadmap was used to identify issues to be taken up in
standard decision-making venues. In 2015, CAISO furthered
the work of the Energy Storage Roadmap through a stakeholder
initiative. In explaining this initiative CAISO states, “These
resources represent an increasingly important part of the future
resource mix and will help lower carbon emissions and provide
operational benefits,” (California Independent System Operator,
2021b). The initiative is now in Phase 4 with ongoing work
to refine the CAISO storage and distributed energy resource
participation models.
CAISO stakeholder engagement processes are ad-hoc, open
to any interested organization or individual, and subject to
California open meeting and open record statutes. Agendas,
minutes, written stakeholder comments, and often responses
and meeting recordings are available to the public. CAISO
staff support the stakeholder process and move the discussion
through an iterative progression of straw proposals, comments,
and revisions. Stakeholders comment but do not cast a vote
on proposals; ultimately the Board files proposed market rule
and other tariff changes with FERC (California Independent
System Operator, 2015). Market participants, CPUC staff, and for
selected topics, civil society and environmental organizations are
regular participants in the meetings.
Communication and information exchange in these meetings
flows largely from CAISO staff to stakeholders, with limited
dialogue among stakeholders during formal meetings. In our
data collection, respondents explained that while they found the
process to be fair, priorities are developed based on consideration
of political influence, stakeholder expertise, FERC regulatory
constraints, data and technology capabilities, and having “skin
in the game.” Stakeholders also explain that these initiatives are
not rigorous legal proceedings with associated due process, rather
having conversations with CAISO staff and management outside
of the stakeholder meetings and having conversations with other
stakeholders is an important part of the overall process and
essential for explaining unique positions and operating practices.
While some stakeholders that compete with the dominant actors
do not feel heard in the process (Respondent 315), other
stakeholders prefer the open opportunity to share information.
As an NGO stakeholder stated:

“With the potential of hybridization that includes storage, you now
have the ability to create what some people call perfect resources. . .
But the rules and the incentives right now are not right for them. It’s
too complicated.” (Respondent 301)

Barriers to storage participation continue to persist in the CAISO
market. For example, further refinements are needed to allow
owners to manage the operation of hybrid energy resources
that pair storage with generation. Moreover, the division of
responsibilities across California agencies creates uncertainty for
storage developers and storage has yet to be fully considered
in the resource adequacy regime or transmission planning.
These new challenges require diverse stakeholder engagement.
As one industry representative explained: “We are starting
to run into issues that no one has run into before and
that requires a lot of engagement” (Respondent 192). These
issues extend beyond traditional RTO stakeholders and require
more explicit consideration of the relationship between FERC
and state regulators. Some stakeholders argue that questions
around coordination and communication are not being discussed
broadly enough. Instead, each utility is figuring out its future,
which is suboptimal and fails to consider reform of the decisionmaking process itself (Respondent 301).

Southwest Power Pool
SPP is often referred to as an RTO that listens to its members.
It places a high value on the “power of relationships” many
of which have been in place since the power pool was formed
80 years ago (Sawyer, 2016). In our data collection, SPP
governance is characterized as responsive to members, slow to
implement change, and seeking unity in decisions. Success is
often measured by avoiding conflict at FERC. It operates with
an accessible board, open interactions with state regulators,
limited use of sector representation, and authority vested in
membership. Members can participate in all meetings, take on
a wide range of leadership responsibilities, and vote on market
rule changes. In contrast, non-members can participate in most
meetings, but cannot initiate rule revisions, nor can they chair
committees, participate in workgroups, or vote. Furthermore,
Board deference to members limits the influence of such nonmember participation.
SPP serves a region that has not restructured retail markets
but instead relies on state regulation of retail rates and
regional coordination of resource adequacy (21st Century Power
Partnership, 2017). In this regulatory setting, the “turf ” utilities
are trying to protect is broader and more directly influenced
by state regulators than in some other regional markets. The
SPP Regional States Committee (RSC) provides collective input

“I. . . have much more influence comparatively speaking at CAISO
than I have at an [RTO like SPP], where I’m sort of looped into
a very bureaucratic convoluted membership structure, and kind of
placed at the bottom of the barrel” (Respondent 342).
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proceedings. In our data collection, stakeholders had opposing
views on these challenges. One perspective is that the governance
structure needs to give more voting weight to those who “bring
the most to the table—generation, transmission, and load,”
whereas, the other perspective is that broader representation,
more independence from transmission utilities, or more assertive
action by the Board is needed to adapt to changing conditions
and emerging technologies. As one non-member new market
entrant noted:

from 11 state regulatory bodies. It is supported by SPP staff
and participates in board meetings, committees, and workgroups.
SPP bylaws grant the RSC authority over cost allocation, financial
transmission rights, planning for remote resources, and regional
resource adequacy. RSC policy determinations on these issues are
filed by SPP, and if warranted, SPP may file a competing proposal
(Southwest Power Pool, 2019a). The RSC considers state policy
as it develops proposals. For example, in 2009 it considered state
RPS requirements in the development of a wind cost allocation
methodology (Hinton, 2019).
FERC’s storage rulemaking largely preceded SPP efforts to
align market design with storage capabilities. In the mid-2010s,
the only storage in the SPP market was a 260 MW pumpedstorage hydroelectric plant that was not dispatched (National
Technology & Engineering Sciences of Sandia, LLC, 2020).
Moreover, although wind resource participation in the market
was growing rapidly, the region was just beginning to explore
how storage could help balance this shift in the generation mix.
SPP began working on a storage participation model following
the FERC NOPR on storage (Southwest Power Pool, 2016). The
SPP Market Working Group, a standing group of between 8
and 18 members with a balance between transmission-owning
and transmission-using members, led this initiative. Between
August and December of 2018, the workgroup organized a
stakeholder education session and developed rule revisions. The
proposed rule changes were reviewed and approved by three
other standing workgroups before proceeding to the Markets
and Operations Policy Committee. This high-level committee
includes a representative for each SPP member and uses supermajority voting across transmission-owning and transmissionusing sectors. Following approval by the members, final approval
for filing with FERC was granted by the Board in a joint
meeting with the Members Committee, which is comprised
of representation across 10 sector designations. In contrast to
a typical SPP stakeholder process with members determining
priorities and pace of decision-making, stakeholders described
the process for Order 841 compliance as heavily driven by
staff and going further than what stakeholders wanted to
implement within the available timeframe. Additionally, the
timing of implementation was delayed in part due to needed
software changes.
Communication and information exchange in these meetings
involves deliberation among participants, with questions,
responses, and “room to compromise or reach a totally different
solution” (Respondent 240). The Board is relatively open and
accessible. It holds joint meetings with members and state
regulatory representatives and board members regularly attend
committee meetings. Yet, some interests, particularly consumer,
energy efficiency, and clean energy interests, have not been at the
table. In our data collection, some stakeholders suggested that
there are “wide gaps between those who have lots of influence
and those who have much less influence” (Respondent 248) and
that initiatives are driven by large utilities (Respondent 244).
Moreover, some stakeholders expressed concern that market
changes and a greater diversity of interests are making it more
difficult to reach consensus. These changes are perceived to be
contributing to a larger role for staff and more conflicts in FERC
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“You do actually substantially need market participants to
comment on, lead and share their experience, not only from their
own personal competitive positions for their business but they’re
also often bringing solutions.” (Respondent 503)

Alongside Order 841 implementation, the Board established a
Holistic Integrated Tariff Team (HITT) to address the challenges
of a shifting generation mix, new technologies, state policy,
and economic development opportunities. An important driving
factor for this initiative was that wind as a share of annual
energy generation increased from 6 to 18% between 2011 and
2018 (Southwest Power Pool Market Monitoring Unit, 2012).
The HITT included 15 members representing the Board, the RSC,
membership, and senior staff, and it was charged with developing
high-level recommendations. This was a departure from typical
member-driven practices in that the Board “took the reins”
(Respondent 405). Stakeholders were allowed to listen to HITT
meetings, but participation was only by invitation. For the HITT
members, this structure provided opportunities for information
sharing, communication, and deliberation on a broad range of
issues. However, the departure from open discussions raised
concerns among other SPP members and non-members.
The final HITT report identified storage as a priority. A
few of the recommendations are specific to storage, such as
evaluating the use of storage to alleviate transmission constraints.
However, many of the recommendations are technology-neutral
approaches to improve reliability, market design, planning, and
cost-allocation in a context with new technologies, resources,
and goals (Southwest Power Pool, 2019b). These improvements
will further enable storage to participate in the market
and are an important step in the right direction from the
perspective of some technology developers. For example, SPP
is currently developing ancillary services and ramping products
to help address the difficulty of balancing wind with old
inflexible coal plants. Moreover, following the initial set of
HITT recommendations, SPP has taken several steps directed
specifically at integrating storage. In 2020, SPP released a
storage white paper and launched an energy storage roadmap.
This was quickly followed by the creation of an Electric
Storage Resources Steering Committee and an Electric Storages
Resources Task Force.

Independent System Operator of New
England
ISO-NE describes itself as “responsible for keeping electricity
flowing across the six New England states and ensuring that
the region has reliable, competitively priced wholesale electricity
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Despite these concerns, as the implementation of Order
841 moved forward, ISO-NE created an Enhanced Storage
Participation model. NEPOOL used its standard processes to
engaged members in two storage initiatives between April and
October of 2018, one to create a storage participation model and
another to address remaining compliance issues delayed due to
data system constraints. The initiatives were first reviewed and
amended by standing technical committees—markets, reliability,
and transmission—composed of representatives from each
membership sector. The initiatives were then considered by the
Participants Committee, a plenary committee of all NEPOOL
voting members. The Committee serves in an advisory role to
ISO-NE and uses weighted voting across six sectors (Independent
System Operator of New England, 2007, 2017).
The Participants Committee approved the enhanced storage
participation rules through a consent agenda and the Order
841 compliance rules with one vote in opposition and two
abstentions. Sector representatives that voted to support, oppose,
and abstain all noted concerns with provisions that would
automatically redeclare storage resource operating limits. This
filing resulted in protests at FERC and subsequent rule revisions.
Communication and information exchange in these meetings
is managed by ISO-NE and NEPOOL staff who control which
topics are on the agenda for discussion and how information
is presented. NEPOOL stakeholder engagement is open to
members but can be difficult for non-members who have more
limited access to information. Once a topic has been opened
for discussion there is a high level of informal exchange among
stakeholders to understand implications, positions, and build
voting coalitions. To be credible in this process a stakeholder
needs to “show up on a regular basis, meet some of the
people, and show that you’re competent on the subject matter”
(Respondent 401). As a result, well-resourced participants, such
as large asset owners, often have a “strong and influential
voice” and state policy representatives can be influential, whereas
consumer interests are considered not well represented. Within
this context, new market entrants may strategically focus on
relatively narrow issues with immediate financial implications
like delays in the interconnection process, rather than working to
develop market rules around a complex issue like fast frequency
response (Respondent 195).
NEPOOL voting is strategic and symbolic. Stakeholders trade
votes for support on future issues and use voting to signal
individual and collective positions.

today and into the future” (Independent System Operator of
New England, 2021b). In our data collection, ISO-NE was
characterized as focused on reliability, an efficient competitive
market, and precise price formation. Governance was described
as a collegial “insider’s game,” conservative, strongly influenced
by incumbents, and requiring consistent participation to be
effective. Participants know each other’s positions, exchange
information, and engage in bargaining and negotiation to
develop market rules.
ISO-NE serves one of the most fully restructured regions in
the country, comprised of six states that have been coordinating
outages, system planning, and dispatch since the early 1970s
through the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL). When the
region restructured the electricity sector, NEPOOL created the
ISO and NEPOOL continues to serve as the stakeholder advisory
group. This organizational separation contributes to a reliance
on FERC as a backstop authority. For example, although ISONE staff are heavily involved in running the stakeholder process,
producing information, and drafting tariff changes, NEPOOL
has its own staff and legal counsel giving it the capacity for
independent review of issues and development of competing
tariff changes that are filed with FERC if they receive approval
through NEPOOL sector-weighted voting.
ISO-NE has largely approached storage market participation
as a modification to existing practice. Two large pumped-storage
hydroelectric facilities have operated in the region since the 1970s
and market rules designed around this early technology allow
storage to participate as either generation or load, with a single
facility able to participate through both models (Independent
System Operator of New England, 2016). However, these rules
don’t consider the capabilities of battery storage, next-generation
pumped-storage hydroelectric technology, or other advanced
storage technologies.
The future of storage resources in ISO-NE is intertwined
with two issues that have dominated recent attention in ISONE market design: natural gas dependence and public policy
resources. In ISO-NE, the share of annual average energy
generation from natural gas increased from 6% to more
than 50% between 1990 and 2012, with the current share at
53% (Independent System Operator of New England, 2021a).
Alongside this shift toward natural gas, all six of the New England
states adopted clean energy policies. By 2015, the region was in a
contentious dialogue around the market integration challenges
of “public policy resources” that receive state economic support
or incentives (Chairman’s Opening Remarks NEPOOL IMAPP
Initiative, 2016). By 2018 when FERC finalized Order 841, each
of the six states in New England also had specific incentives for
energy storage.
When FERC moved forward with the storage rulemaking,
ISO-NE sought to maintain its conventional view of market
participation as either generation or demand. It commented that:

I’m very careful with how I vote because—It’s symbolic about
where I stand on the issue, it impacts alliances and stakeholder
relationships. You have to be really careful about what you’re
coming out strongly against and what you’re not because you need
these people to vote on your stuff later on” (Respondent 403)

Yet, these votes are seen by many stakeholders as simply
signaling stakeholder positions for ISO-NE. Several stakeholders
stated that the process of translating votes into specific
market rules lacks transparency and is not constrained by
stakeholder votes.

“ISO-NE is deeply concerned that the Commission’s emphasis on
‘participation models’ and market participant types is inconsistent
with ISO-NE’s core market design objective to focus on products
rather than participant types” (Independent System Operator of
New England, 2016, p. 12; 2).
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FIGURE 4 | Storage and hybrid (with storage) projects seeking transmission interconnections as of end of 2020. Source: Rand et al. (2021).

forward capacity market, potentially signaling an opening for
storage in this market.

“[ISO-NE] drafts what they’re going to draft . . . and participants
are left to decide whether to support whatever they’re doing or to go
to FERC and try to get changes that they weren’t able to get through
the participants’ process” (Respondent 179)

DISCUSSION
Despite compliance with Order 841, storage developers continue
to experience technical issues limiting participation. For example,
as in other regional markets, hybrid storage and generation
projects are looking to be treated as a single resource with the
owner or operator managing market risk. Also, stakeholders
are suggesting the need for a more agile process and new
venues to encourage discussion among market participants, new
market entrants, transmission grid operators, distribution service
providers, and state policymakers. To this end, attention is now
focused on a Future Grid Initiative considering how to align
policy goals and market rules in a highly decarbonized and
distributed future. This initiative is using new organizational
structures that enable joint meetings of the NEPOOL standing
committees and bring ISO-NE, NEPOOL, and the states into a
common process.

In guiding RTO governance, FERC emphasizes voluntary
participation, regional differences, and the ability for institutions
to evolve. The RTO’s themselves often voice the importance
of regional differences in technologies, resources, and market
design and emphasize the need for regional flexibility. The RTOs
in this study—CAISO, ISO-NE, and SPP—differ in geographic
scope, the extent of regulatory restructuring, and generation
resources. Each of these RTOs has a distinct institutional design
and is shaped by and shapes different political and economic
characteristics. Yet, in comparing these case studies we find
common patterns in how institutional arrangements affect the
articulation of collective interests and the political dynamics
among stakeholders. The emergence of storage technologies and
the eventual proactive step by FERC to require new storage
participation rules provides a common point at which to compare
institutional processes across organizations.
The integration of storage into RTO markets allows us to
identify relevant processes that link RTO governance design
and energy transition outcomes, as well as the processes that
contribute to institutional stability and change. Integrating new
storage technologies involves creating new market rules to
provide opportunities for non-discriminatory participation in
a full range of market services, as well as creating inclusive,
fair, representative, and responsive opportunities for storage
participation in the governance of the organization. In this
context, we compare industry actors, old and new, across
these case studies to better understand structural power and
institutional stability through four mechanisms drawn from

Interconnection of Storage
The three RTOs in our study took different approaches
in developing market rules to enable storage participation,
varied in the modifications made to institutional designs,
and have experienced different outcomes in terms of new
storage projects seeking interconnection (Figure 4). CAISO has
a relatively large amount of interconnected storage but leads
in new projects seeking interconnection. SPP has shifted its
position from having the lowest amount of interconnected
storage among the three studied RTOs. While ISO-NE has
not had an increase in the number of projects seeking
interconnection, two large storage projects just cleared in the
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operates in different contexts by highlighting the influence
of institutional arrangements for regulation at multiple levels
and across different policy systems and functions. Whereas
much of the research on the role of government has identified
an alignment in the power exerted by incumbent industry
and the state (Hess, 2014; Smink et al., 2015; Brisbois
and de Loë, 2016), the ISO-NE and SPP cases illustrate
the limits of state power in regional settings that cross
jurisdictional boundaries.

the literature: (1) self-reinforcing interests, (2) participation in
and position of groups, (3) influence over communication and
information, and (4) control over problem framing and pace
of decisions.

Self-Reinforcing Institutional
Arrangements for Regulation
The ability of incumbent electric utilities to resist regulatory
and institutional changes that threaten their interests has been
studied in the United States (Hess, 2014; Stokes, 2020; Peskoe,
2021). Yet, the complexity of institutional arrangements and
interests resulting from the partial restructuring of the electricity
sector is often overlooked. The IOUs in the CAISO region
own transmission, distribution, and some power resources. The
California storage mandate requires these utilities to procure
specified amounts of storage. Thus, the interests of these utilities
have been more aligned with new market entrants and state
policy than in other regions, particularly in relation to utilityscale resources. The utilities in the SPP region are also vertically
integrated, but the state policy influence and trajectory differ
from the CAISO region. SPP serves a multi-state region and a
relatively large number of public utilities and cooperatives that
are not subject to state rate regulation. The states in the SPP
region negotiated a delegation of authority over transmission cost
allocation and resource adequacy. Additionally, a committee of
state regulators has an established role in the RTO governance
structure. In this case, state regulatory participation and influence
in RTO governance is embedded in institutional design but
requires coordination among the states. Furthermore, unlike the
aggressive clean energy agenda in California policy, the states
served by SPP have generally not pursued active clean energy or
storage policy mandates. In SPP, the expansion of wind resources
has been driven largely by economics. Storage providers are
primarily seeking contracts with utilities, rather than pursuing
independent market participation. In our third case, ISO-NE
serves a region that is highly restructured and has a range of state
clean energy and storage policy goals. In this region, storage is
more often directly competing with incumbent actors. Moreover,
the states in this region lack a formal institutionalized role in ISONE governance. Rather, the organizations representing states in
New England periodically meet with and seek to exert influence
through communication with the RTO board and members. In
this setting, state policymakers and regulators have relatively
less influence compared to industry actors. This has resulted in
open conflicts between ISO-NE and state regulators supporting
clean energy goals and new technologies. These differences in
the institutional arrangements for regulation in each region
align with differences in collective identities and dominant logics
identified in the cases.
The comparison of these cases indicates that RTO integration
of new technologies is facilitated when doing so aligns with
the interests of legacy industry actors. This finding is consistent
with previous research that suggests self-reinforcing interests
contribute to the ability of legacy electricity industry actors
to exert influence through strategic action. Importantly, it
also expands our understanding of how this mechanism
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Misalignment of Participation Structures
Storage has unique technical capabilities and does not
fit neatly into existing market participation models, the
stakeholder engagement sectors that organize participants, or
the standing committees responsible for different decisions.
The institutionalization of these structures helps explain the
slow pace of change and dynamics among actors (Fuenfschilling
and Truffer, 2014). Each of the three RTOs began by allowing
storage to participate in existing market products. Initial efforts
to modify the products and participation models developed for
legacy technologies, including pumped-storage hydroelectricity,
left gaps that prevented storage from providing a full range of
services. Similarly, efforts to allow participation in governance
through the existing membership sectors and committee
hierarchies in SPP and ISO-NE have limited the participation
and influence of new market entrants in developing the RTO
market design, operating practices, or planning processes.
RTOs, other than CAISO, have formal rules for participation
in governance and these structures institutionalize how interests
are grouped, the relative power of different groups in voting
processes, and which stakeholders are included or excluded
from conversations. The sectors used to form RTO interest
groups evolved from interest alignments formed as the electricity
industry sought economic efficiencies and along with legacy
technologies that differ from the business models, capabilities,
and interests of newer storage technologies. As a result,
new market entrants must align with a particular business
model or service, such as generation or transmission, despite
having capabilities and interests that span existing groups
or differ from others in the group. Unaddressed, these
structural misalignments create an institutional bias toward
incumbent approaches.

Differences in Influence Over
Communication and Shared Information
New policy actions, such as the FERC order requiring storage
participation rules, could be expected to create positive feedback
by empowering different stakeholders and building capacity
through new access to decision-makers or new forums (Pierson,
1993). Our cases show an important aspect of this mechanism
is the nature of previous practices for communication and
information sharing. While the CAISO case study provides
support for the classic view of policy feedback, the operation
of this mechanism in SPP and ISO-NE differ. In CAISO,
communication processes are focused on providing staff with
information and new knowledge for decision-making. The
emergence of storage as an issue for RTO staff led to new
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technical settings. However, a focus on the mechanisms that
operate within RTO governance provides insight into needed
institutional reform and the findings in this study suggest that
RTO stakeholder engagement practices could be strengthened.
State and federal regulators are increasingly being called to
address the complexities of energy federalism and the blurring
of previously well-defined allocation of authority between state
and federal regulators. Central to this challenge is consideration
of the institutional designs for the interface between federal and
state authority within RTO governance structures. This study
highlights how the political and economic characteristics of each
region shape the relative influence of different stakeholders.
In regional settings that limit the power of state regulators
relative to industry actors, FERC needs to re-examine the
mechanisms that grant industry actors structural power in
RTO processes. The existing diversity of structural relationships
between state regulators and RTOs provide accepted examples of
alternative arrangements.
Additionally, this study shows that traditional RTO
participation structures designed around legacy technologies
and to promote market restructuring are not aligned with
new market participants and interests. Rather than continuing
to grant structural power to incumbent actors by approving
these institutional designs, regulators should develop processes
to illuminate the details of existing designs. Furthermore,
regulators, perhaps through the newly created FERC Office for
Public Participation, should also engage in a process with a
broad range of stakeholder interests to realign public interests
with RTO governance participation rules, sectors, and venues.
Finally, in addition to gaining a better understanding of how
RTO stakeholder voting regimes operate, more attention
should be directed to the procedural mechanisms that affect
influence over new knowledge, access to information, priority
setting, problem framing, and the pace of decisions. It is
possible that providing guidance to and requiring additional
accountability of RTO boards may be useful in addressing these
procedural mechanisms.
The importance of taking institutional design seriously is
underscored by the dynamic nature of energy transitions.
Although FERC now requires RTOs to meet minimum storage
participation provisions, evolving technological capabilities,
policy goals, and community interests will require continued
market and governance adaptations. For example, in each of
the studied RTOs, market design attention has shifted from
storage gaining access to the market to exploring how to integrate
hybrid storage and generation projects. Moreover, expanding the
discussion to consider the implications of hybrid resources for
the transmission-distribution interface has been more difficult.
Without additional RTO governance reform, the scale and pace
of transition that integrates new technologies and new design
for system operations may continue to differ across the RTOs
and may continue to diverge from state policy goals. FERC and
state regulators could take important action to enable system
resilience and sustainability by opening technical conferences
and other information-gathering efforts to better understand the
technical and legal challenges of this anticipated transformation
in grid operations.

stakeholders gaining influence and ad hoc venues to share
knowledge. In contrast, communication processes in SPP,
and to an even greater extent in ISO-NE, depend more on
communication among stakeholders to building voting coalitions
and strategic alliances. In this context, the emergence of storage
as an issue within RTO governance requires reconsideration
of stakeholder relationships. While SPP did little to engage
stakeholders around storage before Order 841, it has since
created new governance forums that create opportunities for
both information exchange and the development of stakeholder
relationships. Thus far, ISO-NE has done little to change access or
venues. In this context, storage developers are focusing on narrow
issues or developing relationships with stakeholders, such as solar
developers, that have existing access and influence in the process.
In this case, policy feedback was resisted by incumbent actors.

Control Over the Agenda and
Problem-Framing in Highly Technical
Settings
Our cases show that the ability to influence problem definitions,
the range of solutions considered, and the pace of the process
are particularly important in highly technical decision-making
venues. The influence of competing ideas is shaped by the ability
to define the focus of decision-making processes and the framing
of problems and solutions (Breslau, 2013; Hess, 2019; Kungl and
Hess, 2021). Stakeholders in each of the studied RTOs describe
how some stakeholders are more constrained than others by
the time and expertise required to be an influential participant.
Highly technical decision-making venues create barriers for some
stakeholders, including small organizations, disparate interests,
new market entrants, and groups with broad participation, such
as consumers. These stakeholders must balance how to engage
in processes that require high levels of expertise and a consistent
presence with their own available capacity and uncertain gains.
Within this context, the RTO boards, in conjunction with
management and staff, influence market design through strategic
guidance, priority settings, and management of the pace of
decision-making. Our cases provide evidence of this influence,
as well as differences in the ability of powerful stakeholders to
influence problem-framing. For example, in CAISO staff develop
the initial problem framing whereas, in other RTOs stakeholders
are more directly involved in developing problem statements.

CONCLUSION
New technologies, business models, and policy priorities require
new market participation models and rules, but also require new
governance and new institutional designs. This paper compares
three case studies of RTO rule development and identifies
common mechanisms that describe the relationship between
RTO institutional design and market rule outcomes. Across all
three RTOs, we identify similar structures and practices shaping
administrative rules. Institutional theory suggests that political
processes create self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms and are
especially difficult to reform because it can be difficult to evaluate
how they are performing. This complexity is heightened in highly
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